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Proportionality review is the General Assembly of Virginia's attempt to
insure that the death penalty is administered as fairly as possible. All cases in
which a defendant has been sentenced to death must automatically undergo a
review bythe Supreme Court of Virginia to determine that the sentence is neither
excessive nor disproportionate to the sentences imposed in similar cases In
order to conduct the proportionalityreview, the Supreme Court of Virginia may
accumulate records of capital felony cases tried within a time that is determined
bythe court The court shall consider available records and those records must
be made available to circuit courts.4
This article will focus on the failure of the Supreme Court of Virginia
accuratelyto compare both crimes and defendants when conducting the propor-
tionality review and to take into account the changes that have occurred in capital
case law. Proportionalityreviews, as they are currentlyconducted, fail to include
a variety of life cases. This necessarily skews the comparison. The court also
fails adequately to compare similar defendants. In fact, it is often the case that
the only comparison of defendants is on prior criminal records. This completely
ignores other relevant personal similarities or dissimilarities. In addition, the
court also fails to take into account the changes that have occurred in capital law.
* J.D. Candidate, May2003, Washington & Lee University School of Law, BA, Auburn
University. Thank you to Professor Roger D. Groot and all the members of the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse for your patience and guidance. This article is dedicated to the loving memory
of my father who will alwys be my inspiration. To my mother and Richard, thank you for your
constant love and support. And, to my brother, David, and sister-in-aw, Tern, thank you for
believing in me and for helping me to believe in myself.
2. VA. ODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Mlfchie 1999). Section 17.1-313 states in pertinent part:
In addition to consideration of any errors in the trial enumerated byappeal, the court
shall consider and determine: . . . Whether the sentence of death is excessive or






Changes in procedural issues such as mitigation, the process of voir dire, and
parole eligibility, have all had an impact on the comparison. Cases that occurred
after these changes should not be compared to those that occurred before these
changes because the latter cases are substantiallydifferent from the former. This
article will show that if there is ever to be meaningful proportionality review, the
way in which it is conducted must be changed.
II 7x Pmp c ty RemewSta
Proportionality review has been mandated by the General Assembly in
Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code.' The statute requires that any sentence
of death be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Virginia6 The
statute further provides, in relevant part, that:
In addition to consideration of any errors in the trial enumerated by
appeal, the court shall consider and determine: ... Whether the sen-
tence of death is excessive or disproporionate to the penakyinosed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant
It is important to note that this part of the statute requires comparison of two
separate elements-the crime and the defendant. An adequate proportionality
review demands that both be compared in order fully to determine that the
sentence imposed is proportional to sentences imposed in cases involving similar
situations.
The statute requires the court to review available records. It does not,
however, require the court to collect case records from either the Court of
Appeals of Virginia or the Virginia circuit courts.8 Rather, Section 17.1-313(E)
states that "[tihe Supreme Court ary accumulate the records of all capital felony
cases g&i/within such period of time as the court maydetermine."' The statute's
use of "may" could have been a way to prevent defendants from claiming that
the proportionalityreview requirement was not fulfilled if all available cases were
not used in the comparison, or perhaps to relieve the court of the burden of
collecting and comparing all available capital cases."0 Whatever the reason for the
statute's use of "may," leaving the determination of the cases to be accumulated
at the discretion of the court leads to a great number of relevant cases being left
out of the proportionalityreview. The statute's use of "tried" implicates that the
review is meant to include more than just those capital cases which are appealed.




8. SeKeflyE.P. Bennett, Pkti Reew 7hHimx H d lApfimaw" Dodmi, 12
CAP. DEF.J. 103, 108 (1999) (discussing Virginia's proportionality reviev4.
9. S 17.1-313(E) (emphasis added); see Bennett, s"ir note 8, at 108.
10. S 17.1-313(E); sieBennet, s"pr note 8, at 108.
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Appeals of Virginia or the Virginia circuit courts." The result of the Supreme
Court's failure to collect and compare cases from the lower courts precludes
consideration of a disproportionate number of cases in which a life sentence was
imposed. Life cases are rarely appealed to the Supreme Court and therefore the
chances of these cases being included in the proportionality review is severely
reduced. 2
This failure to use life cases in the proportionality review is one of the most
significant problems with the proportionalityreview as it is currentlyconducted.
Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code requires the Supreme Court of Virginia,
when conducting a proportionality review, to review available records to deter-
mine whether the sentence imposed is excessive. 3 The relevant portion of the
statute reads, "[t]he court sha/tconsider such records as are available as a guide
in determining whether the sentence imposed in the case under review is exces-
sive."14 In order to avoid a finding of an excessive sentence it is necessaryfor the
court to compare each case in which the defendant was sentenced to death with
other cases in which a similar crime was committed to determine if the death
penalty has generally been imposed for that particular type of crime."5
Under Virginia Code Section 17.1-313, the Vhrginia Supreme Court is also
given discretion to determine whether capital cases will be accumulated as well
as the period of time within which records of cases will be accumulated for
purposes of aproportionalityreview. 16 In Bai/yv Cmnmuadth, Justice Koontz
explained that the Court has a standing order that directs the clerk of the court
to "segregate and accumulate" the printed records and opinions in Class 1 felony
cases, to maintain an index of cases and to make that index available for examina-
tion upon the request of any court of record in the Commonwealth or in the
federal jurisdiction' Justice Koontz then stated that the archive contains the
records of all appeals of convictions whether the sentence imposed was life or
death. 9 These records are also cross-indexed according to the offense, the
sentence imposed and whether that sentence was imposed by a judge or jury.20
It is not dear that life cases actually are reviewed or that anymeaningful re-
examination is done. The Supreme Court appears to include in the review
records only those cases which are appealed to the Supreme Court or those in
11. See Bennett, s"qra note 8, at 108.
12. Id at 109.
13. S 17.1-313(E).
14. Id (emphasis added).
15. Id
16. S 17.1-313.
17. 529 S.E.2d 570 (Va. 2000).
18. Baileyv. Commonwealth, 529 S.E2d 570,580 (Va. 2000) (specifying the procedure for





which a death sentence has been imposed and the review is therefore mandatory.
There appears to be no effort on the part of the Supreme Court to seek out
capital cases that appear at either the circuit court or court of appeals level If the
statute and the scheme set out above were followed, it stands to reason that there
would have been sentences that would have been reversed on proportionality
grounds. As it stands, the notion of a review seems to be an illusion, and the
statute requiring it seems to serve no real purpose.
IlM Iznvt P in de PThqc zyReewSta=&
There are instances in which life sentence cases are appealed to the Supreme
Court of Virginia.21 When this occurs, these cases are available for use in the
proportionality review. However, it is often the case that these life cases are of
no real help in determining proportionality of sentencing because theyoften lack
information regarding both facts about the sentencing process, and the crime
itself.22 There are only two available sentences for a defendant convicted of
capital murder, a sentence of life or a sentence of death.3 A defendant given a
life sentence can receive no lesser sentence, therefore, when life sentence cases
are appealed, they are never appealed on sentencing issues. As a result, when life
sentence cases are appealed they are appealed for trial error only. The few life
sentence cases that finally reach the Supreme Court of Virginia do so on discre-
tionary review from the Court of Appeals. Due to the fact that the Supreme
Court of Virginia sees so few of these cases, a significant number of relevant life
cases are neglected in the proportionality review process.24 As a result of life
cases only being appealed for issues of trial error, those few life cases that are
heard bythe Supreme Court of Virginia are often not factuallydeveloped on the
issue of sentencing." This is a problem because the lack of factual information
makes these cases deficient as tools when determining whether similar circum-
stances exist. Because there are so few life cases appealed to the Supreme Court
of Virginia and the fewthat are appealed provide minimal assistance, the propor-
tionality review tends to be neither proportional nor an actual review.
For all these reasons, it is easy for the court to allow the review to become
no more than an exercise in finding similar cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed, thereby making the sentence in the instant case proportional,
rather than actually determining whether juries and judges have generally im-
posed death sentences in similar circumstances. For proportionality review to
21. So eg, Burile v. Gonm o wealh, 544 SE.2d 360 (Va. 2001). In Bwu* the defendant
was sentenced to life for two capital murder charges and appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia
on the issue of whether a jury must find that the defendant was a principal in the first degree, or
'triggerman," in each killing in order to convict a defendant of capital murder. Mt at 362-63.
22. See Bennett, s"gWm note 8, at 110.
23. VA. QODE ANN. S 192-264.4(A) Mchie 2000).




actuallyserve anypurpose it is necessaryfor the court to include a much broader
collection of cases in its records. Onlythen can it determine accurately and fairly
how juries and judges tend to sentence capital defendants.
A. Fawr L to i&rLeSw=xeCass
In order for the Supreme Court of Virginia to conduct a serious propor-
tionality review there are several classes of cases that need to be accumlated.
(lasses of cases that need to be included in the proportionality review that are
not currently included are: (1) bench trials resulting in life sentences; (2) guilty
pleas resulting in a life sentence not pursuant to a plea bargain on charge or
sentence; (3) cases in which the judge sentences to life over the jury's death
verdict; (4) jurytrials in which a life sentence was imposed and not appealed; and
(5) jury trials in which a life sentence was imposed and later appealed on trial
error.
1. Berm Trias
Bench trials in which a life sentence has been imposed are not included in
proportionality reviews because these cases are not generally appealed.26 Bench
trials in which a defendant was given a life sentence cannot be appealed on either
trial enor or sentencing issues. The cases cannot be appealed for sentencing
issues because a life sentence was imposed and no lesser sentence was available.
In a bench trial the judge rather than the jury is the factfinder. When the judge
is the factfmder no error can be shown because it is accepted that as the
factfinder, the judge would generally follow his own instructions." Judges are
aware of the rules of evidence and procedure and it is presumed that they rou-
tinely hear inadmissible evidence which they disregard when maldng decisions.
These cases could be accumulated bythe Supreme Court of Virginia and included
in the review but the proportionality review statute does not require that these
cases be accumulated. This failure to accumulate results in a number of relevant
cases being left out of the review:
2. GVAwt~as
In cases in which a guilty plea was entered and a life sentence imposed, the
only recourse is habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.2, A
26. Gregory v. Commonwealth, No. 1671-99-2,2001 WL 242227, at *1 (Va. CL App. Mar.
13, 2001). This is an unpublished opinion in a capital case in which the defendant received a life
sentence at a bench trial Id
27. Sgvzmy Harris v. Rivera, 454 US. 339,346 (1981) (holding that an apparent inconsis-
tencyin the trial judge's verdict was insufficient to overcome the welltestablished presumption that
the judge adhered to the basic rules of procedure).
28. Se Robinson v. Deeds, Nos. 92493, 92494,92601, 2000 WL 274154, at *1 (Va. Car. C.
Jan. 10, 2000) (denying defendant, after his plea of guilty, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
2002]
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defendant cannot appeal the verdict upon a plea of guilty, and there is obviously
no claim of trial error when there has been no triaL For example, in Cmmnm
multb v HqfirW,29 the defendant, who did not have a charge or sentence
bargain, pleaded guilty to capital murder. Hefelfmger was sentenced to life
imprisonment." This case is particularlyinteresting because it was a life sentence
for a case that involved rather heinous facts: the defendant abducted a twelve-
year- old girl after smothering her in her bedroom, he drove for a while before
stopping and having sex with the corpse, he then dismembered the body. While
the head and limbs were found, the torso is still missing. The facts of the case
are heinous and yet the defendant was given a life sentence. This case could be
veryuseful in a proportionalityreview but it will never be included because cases
in which the defendant pleads guilty are not accumulated bythe Supreme Court
of Virginia to be included in the records for proportionality review.
3. Ju* Gus Li O -Jwy Venk qCDezt
In Wva/ler v Q, 31 the jury found W'mckler guilty of robbery,
abduction, and capital murder, the jury then sentenced her to death for the
capital murder conviction. 2 Winckler, alo with three other defendants, was
convicted for the murder of Stacey Hanna. Winckler was the only defendant
for whom the jury recommended the death penalty' The judge in the case set
aside the jury's death sentence and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on
the capital murder conviction." Virginia Code Section 192-264.5 gives a judge
the authority to set aside a sentence of death." Cases in which the judge sets
aside a death penaltycan onlybe appealed on issues of trial error. W'mklerwould
be an excellent case to include in the proportionality review because the opinion
is replete with factual information regarding the circumstances of the crime.
4. Jwy Gi L #[-NoAp ptd
The most obvious cases which are ignored in the proportionality review are
those cases in which a jury sentences a defendant to life upon the conviction of
for ineffective assistance of counsel).
29. No. CR 00000109 (Cityof Norfolk Cir. Q. Sept. 11,2000).
30. Commonwealth v. Hefelfinger, No. CR 00000109 (City of Norfolk Cir. O. Sept. 11,
2000). This case is unreported because the defendant pleaded gulty.
31. 531 S.E.2d 45 (Va. 2000).
32. Wnckler v. Commonweatb, 531 SE.2d 45,48 (Va. 2000). Winclder was sentenced to




36. 1A seeako VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Wlie 2000) (allowing judge to set aside death
sentence after consideration of post-sentence report and for good cause).
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capital murder and the defendant does not appeal. In CaMirinee V Fzl n
the defendant was sentenced to life and did not appeal on trial error." In Fenin
the defendant stabbed the victim, a drug dealer, multiple times during a fight over
drugs. The jury sentenced Fleming to life imprisonment plus twenty-five years.
This case and others like it will not be included in the review because while the
statute says the records mayinclude all cases oi the Supreme Court of Virginia
does not accumulate cases in which there was no appeal.
5. Jwy Giw L ,Appeafbr Trial E rr
The fifth category of cases that are neglected in the proportionality review
are those cases in which a jury sentenced a defendant to life, and the defendant
appeals on trial error. These cases could potentially reach the Supreme Court of
Virginia and be included among cases considered in a proportionality review.
However, these cases may onlybe appealed on trial error and therefore will often
not be helpful in the review because they lackinformation regarding the sentenc-
ing process. In Laruw v Caoimmea 9 William Ray Layne, who had been
convicted of capital murder of a child under twelve in the commission of an
abduction with intent to defile and sentenced to life by the jury, appealed his
conviction based on trial error.4' Layne claimed that the trial court had errone-
ously admitted hearsay testimony. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed
the conviction.42 The opinion from the Court of Appeals contained almost no
information about the nature of the crime."3 Thus, even if this case were to be
included in the review it would not provide necessary factual infomation that
would be useful in determining whether similar crimes and defendants were
treated similarly. Its veryexistence, however, does demonstrate that at least one
juryrefused to sentence to death a defendant who sexually abused, abducted and
murdered a young girl.
B. FAI*w to Cwxe Doiian
Virginia's proportionality review again proves to be inadequate and incomn-
plete due to the court's failure to compare the instant defendant to other capital
37. No. (R 98010595 (Gtyof Lynchburg Or. C. Feb. 22, 1999).
38. Commonwealthv. Fleming, No. CR98010595 (Chyof Lynchburg Cir. Q.Feb. 22,1999).
39. No 0682-94-3, 1996 WL 12682, at *1 (Va. C. App. Jan. 16,1996).
40. Layne v. Commonwealth, No. 0682-94-3, 1996 WL 12682, at *1 (Va. CL App. Jan. 16,
1996) (holding that the trial court had not erred in admitting heazaytestimony); seVA. CODE ANN.
S 18.2-31(8) (Mlchie Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996) (stating that "[tlhe willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing of a child under the age of twelve r in thecommission of abduction... when such
abduction was committed ... with the intent to defile the victim" is an offense that shall constitute
capital murder).
41. Laytm 1996 WL 12682, at *1.
42. Id, at *2.
43. Id, at* 2.
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defendants." Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code requires the Supreme Court
of Virginia to conduct proportionality review to determine "[wihether the
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and dx dOxv. " 41 This portion of the
statute obviously requires the court not onlyto determine that the crime in the
instant case is similar to other crimes for which juries have generally imposed
death, but also to determine that the defendant in the instant case is, in compari-
son to similarly situated defendants, a good candidate for death.46 The compari-
son must involve similar crimes and similar defendants.47 The review of the
defendant is rmandatory."' When comparing defendants the court should, at a
minimur, look at age, psychological status, personal history, and past criminal
records. In short, comparison of defendants should include comparison ofmitigation evidence with aggravation evidence. Making these comparisons are
the only way the court can determine whether similar defendants are similarly
sentenced. Despite the statutory requirement, the Supreme Court of Virginia
almost always fails to compare defendants when determining the proportionality
of a sentence.49
The defendants used in the comparison are almost exclusively those that
have been given death sentences. Consequently, most reviews become determi-
nations of whether the conduct of the defendant under review is similar to that
of other defendants who have been sentenced to death, rather than an analysis
of whether juries have generally given a sentence of death to similar defendants.s°
Again, this results in an incomplete and inaccurate proportionality review.
In Ja&scn v Qmwvwm1k,s the trial court convicted the defendant, a
juvenile, of capital murder and sentenced him to death on the "future dangerous-
ness" predicate. 2 Jackson was sixteen-years-old when he committed the crime. 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia conducted the mandated proportionalityreview,
44. See Bemnett, s"lm note 8,at 118.
45. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2) (Mdichie 1999) (emphasis added);saeBennett, s" note
8, at 118.
46. SeeVA. CoDE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2) (Michie 1999); sealsoBennet, sra note 8, at 118.
47. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2) (Mlchie 1999).
48. Id
49. SeeBennett, s,m note 8, at 121;sw e&, Ramdass v. Commonweakh, 437 S.E.2d 566,574
(Va. 1993). In conducting the proportionality review, the court looked at the defendant's criminal
history, previous probation violations, previous prison sentences, length of time between release
from prison and commission of another crime, malice of his previous crimes, and the crime
currently under review. Id Tiis review did nothing but look at the bad history and failed to
comare the defendant to other defendans. Id;swaloDubois v. Commonwealh, 435 S.E.2d 636,
640 (V 1993) (eviewing onlythe defendant's prior criminal record, the fact that current crime was
committed whie on mandatory parole and the malice evidenced in the current offense).
50. Bennet, s"pra note 8, at 120.
51. 499 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1998).
52. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E2d 538, 542-43 (Va. 1998).
53. Id at 542.
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in which it compared Jackson's crime to crimes in other capital cases, particularly
those in which robbery or attempted robberywas the underlying felony and the
death penalty was based on the "future dangerousness" predicate.-' While the
Supreme Court made a comparison of similar crimes, it failed to compare similar
defendants. Justice Hassell's dissent inJadesn commented that the failure of the
court to compare similar defendants produced an inaccurate proportionality
review."5 Justice Hassell noted that of the ten sixteen-year-olds who had been
convicted of capital murders to that date, Jackson was the only one who had
been sentenced to death.' This is a perfect example of whyit is important, when
conducting proportionalityreview, to compare defendants as well as crimes. The
inadequate review failed to reveal the disproportionality of Jackson's sentence.
IV. 7 u Ptms cfbr ilRetiewFails to Rea ze & Chai Tmw
A. E dwi StrdanfirfDery Un/er die E ' A nrrn f thje United States
Qostiudion
Current proportionality review fails to account for the evolving standards
of decency under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
which have led to procedural changes in capital law."7 At a minimum, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishment that would have been considered cruel and
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.58 However, the protections
of the Eighth Amendment not onlyapplyto those punishments considered cruel
and unusual under the common law in 1789, but also to those punishments
considered cruel and unusual by contemporary standards. sY
The Supreme Court of the United States has had few occasions to give
precise meaning to "cruel and unusual punishment." However, the Court
recognized that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 6°
The Eighth Amendment exists to ensure that while the State has the power to
punish, "this power [must] be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." 1
In determining evolving standards, the Court must look to objective evidence of
54. Id at 554-55.
55. Id at 557 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 555-57.
57. Se US. Co-T. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ments).
58. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US. 399, 405 (1986) (holding that executing the insane is
unconstitutional because there is no basis to accept execution of the insane in either English
common law or within modem community standards).
59. Idat406.
60. Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not
permit Congress to take away petitioner's citizenship as punishment for a crime).
61. Id at 100.
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society's views of a particular punishment.'a "The clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
[various] legislatures" as well as "data concerning the actions of sentencing
juries."63 There are a few situations in which the Court has categorically deter-
mined that the death penalty is excessive and therefore prohibited bythe Eighth
Amendment. The substantively protected Eighth Amendment categories
include: (1) those defendants fifteen or younger;, (2) the insane;6 (3) those
convicted of raping an adult woman;, and (4) certain accomplices to murder.7
This list is not exhaustive and evolving standards may require that other crimes
and/or defendants be removed from the list of death eligibility.6 The fact that
society's views as well as capital jurisprudence in general have changed cannot be
ignored when determining the proportionality of the sentence in a particular
situation.
Society's views on the death penalty have changed over the last few years.
Many more potential life jurors exist todaythan existed almost ten years ago. A
Gas poll conducted in 2000 shows that sixtysix percent of Americans ae in
favor of the death penalty, while twenty eight percent oppose the death penalty.
69
While this shows that a majority of Americans are still in favor of the death
penalty, it is important to note that at sixty-six percent, support for the death
penalty is at its lowest support level since 1981.a The death penalty had its
highest level of support in 1994 when eighty percent of Americans favored the
death penalty. 1 These numbers show that support for the death penalty has
dropped fourteen percent in the last eight years.
62. Coker v. Georgia, 433 US. 584, 593-97 (1977) (holding that a sentence of death for the
rape of an adult woman was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782,788-96 (1982) (holding that a sentence of death for an accomplice to a murder was excessive
and therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
63. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (holding that executing mentally retarded
defendants convicted of capital offenses is not categoricallyprohibited bythe Eighth Amendment).
64. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 US. 815, 838 (1988).
65. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US. 399,410 (1986).
66. Se Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
67. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 US. 137 (1987). For a discussion of these decisions, see
generally Kimberly A. Orem, Ewuhdn q'anE#& A eg Dirlm Saustvaw anzi Promwd
Itaxo usdinthe Chdand UnwuslPwrbrnmr mae m Cid Gzts, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 345, 351-54
(2000).
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E2d 312,319-20 (2000) (holding that while the death sentence
was proportional in the instant case, mental retardation can be used as a mitigating factor), wt
grvai 122 S. C. 24 (US. Va. Sept. 25,2001) (No. 00-8452) (arg. Feb. 20,2002).
69. Frank Newport, Suppwfor Desb PmrlDmp toLotwt Leud in 19 Yam, Abbd# Still
Hig at 66%, (Feb. 24, 2000) at http.J/www.gallup.com/poll/releases/p000224.asp.
70. Id The results of the poll are based on telephone interviews conducted with a randomly
selected national sample of 1,050 adults, 18 years and older, conducted on February 14-15, 2000.
Id One can say with 95% confidence that the maximam error attributable to sampling and other




In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Funnm u G a 2 ruled that
the death penalty as it was practiced constituted cruel and unusual punishment
which was prohibited bythe Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.73 The Court stated that the death penalty was unconstitutional as it was
applied in the state statutory schemes because the sentencing mechanisms were
standardless, and provided no rational basis for who should live and who should
die."" However, four years later, in Gm& v Ge7i,'5 the Court determined that
the death penalty could in fact be applied in a constitutional manner if certain
safeguards were inserted into the capital trial and sentencing process.76 One way
in which states have accomplished this task is to narrow the class of death eligible
persons." The states have used various methods to narrow the class: making
only certain crimes punishable by death, requiring the presence of at least one
aggravating factor, and allowing the admission of mitigation evidence." By
narrowing the class of death eligible persons, the states are attempting to provide
the "procedural" protections required bythe Eighth Amendment. The "substan-
tive" protections come in the prohibition of punishing specific crimes with a
sentence of death.79 Requiring proportionalityreviewis yet another wayin which
states have implemented protections to ensure that the death penalty remains
constitutional
B. C1vW in Capital LawSinx Furman
The notion of evolving standards has had a direct impact on capital
punishment law. Procedural changes have been made to accommodate changing
notions of fairness. Gmorequired safeguards in order to make the death penalty
72. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
73. Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death
penalty as applied in state statutes before the Court violated the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution.
74. Id at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring); seeaho Kimberly A Orem, Ewtduin qanEi#&
A mnarDdjwvd Sul 1Prv&*uenduPwroxmit= zd e Cudard U wiPtrshm-,t aue
in azCsts, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 345, 351-54 (2000).
75. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
76. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 195 (1976) (holding that the death penalty does not
violate the Eighth Amendment, thereby rejecting Fwm.
77. Sw, eg, McCeskyv. Kemp, 481 US. 279, 305-08 (1987) (identifying specific crimes for
which death penalty can be imposed, requiring sentencer to find at least one aggravating factor and
requiring that mitigation evidence be accessible to the sentencing body).
78. So; eg, Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (holding constitutional the
rnandatory imposition of a death sentence if jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, or where the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances, so long as jury is not denied any mitigating evidence).
79. See Kimberly A. Orem, Etdutia cf an E06* Anmx~ DWjxwW Subtmtv a nd




constitutional. Examples of safeguards that have been implemented into capital
law include: requiring the presentation of mitigation evidence; 0 requiring
instructions about the ineligibility of parole for those defendants convicted of
capital crimes;81" and changes in voir dire that insure that jurors can consider both
life and death before they are allowed to sit on a jury." The aforementioned
procedural changes are intended to increase the fairness of the process. These
safeguards occur at different times within the process. Presentation of mitigation
evidence and instruction on the ineligibility of parole occur in the sentencing
phase of the trial. The direct application of different procedures at different
times should effect proportionality review because the variance in process can
yield disparate outcomes. The reuirement that it be determined during voir dire
that a juror could consider both life and death occurs during the initial guilt phase
of the trial, but because it has a direct effect on what the make-up of the sentenc-
ing bodywill be, this safeguard plays a major role in proportionality review. Due
to the direct role that each of these procedural safeguards plays in the process of
determining the sentence imposed in a capital trial, it is necessary to consider
how they effect the overall composition of the records used for comparison in
proportionality review. The effect that the implementation of these safeguards
has had on sentencing makes it inappropriate to compare current cases to those
which were decided before these safeguards existed.
I. Mitin
Mitigation evidence is presented during the penalty phase of the trial. It is
used to provide background information on the defendant for consideration by
the sentencing body when determining the sentence. In Sewm uo v nrnCuadt,
the court said that "mitigating factors are those circumstances which do not
justify or excuse the offense, but which in fairness or mercy may be considered
as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability and punishment.""3
Mitigation evidence may include information on the mental health of the defen-
dant, the defendant's childhood and background, and testimonyin support of the
80. Se Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E2d 394, 408-09 (Va. 1993) (holding that the
presentation of mitigation evidence is required).
81. SaeSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,162 (1994) (holding that a "life means life"
instruction must be given where future dangerousness is used as the aggravating factor and sentence
options are onlya life or death sentence); Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (1999)
(holding that life means life" instructions should be given in cases where vileness is used as the
aggravating factor).
82. S Vrherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (holing that the state is not entitled
to exclusion for cause, even if the juror expressed scruples, unless both "unmistakably clar" and
automatica were present in voir dire); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 US. 412 (1985) (holding that
the state is allowed to exclude any juror whose views prevent him from performing his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 US. 719 (1992)
(holding that, to meet due process demands, a defendant must be allowed to exclude a juror that
would automatically vote for the death penay).
83. Steuwt, 427 S1E2d at 408-09 (quoting the trial court's jury instruction).
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defendant from friends or family."' It is necessary for the court to provide the
sentencing body with all of the relevant mitigating information so that the
sentencing body can make an individualized assessment as to the need for the
death penaltyin each specific case." In L c&d1v OW 6 the Court stated that due
to the unique and final nature of the death penalty there is great importance
placed on the notion of individualization of sentences."' The Court emphasized
that "where sentencing discretion is granted, it generallyhas been agreed that the
sentencing judge's 'possession of the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics' is h]ighly relevant- #i mt essenai-[to the]
selection of an appropriate sentence.'"" The Court again addressed the impor-
tance of mitigation evidence in Eddi v Cx d 9 when it held that just as a
state may not constitutionally bar the sentencing body's access to mitigation
material, the sentencer cannot refuse to consider relevant mitigation evidence.O
Following Eddi and Lodeet presentation of mitigation evidence is now re-
quired. In Virginia, William u Ta&W' essentially made the presentation ofmitigation evidence mandatory.'2 On remand from the United States Supreme
Court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia agreed
with the circuit court that the trial-counsel left out a great deal of mitigation
evidence including: (1) evidence that Williams was abused by his father, (2)
testimony of correctional officers who would testify that Wlliams was not a
danger while incarcerated; (3) commendations while in prison for helping to
break up a drug ring and returning the warden's wallet; (4) character witnesses;
(5) evidence that Williams was borderline mentally retarded; and (6) juvenile
records of growing up in a home under reprehensible conditions with intoxicated
parents.93 The United States Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of
84. Id at 407-09 (holding that testimony of expert appointed upon motion of Common-
wealth to evaluate defendant concerning existence or absence of mitigation circumstances relating
to mental condition was not limited to matters of mitigation and could evaluate future dangerous-
ness).
85. Orem, s"pra note 79, at 350.
86. 438 US. 586 (1978).
87. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586,604-05 (1978) (holding that limits imposed on mitigation
material available to the sentencer violated defendant's constitutional rights).
88. Id at 602-03 (alteration in original) (quoting Wliams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949)).
89. 455 US. 104 (1982).
90. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US. 104, 113-14 (1982) (holding that a sentencer must
consider relevant mitigating evidence).
91. 529 US. 362 (2000).
92. Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362 (2000) (holding that W'ilams's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel was violated and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
refusing to set aside his death sentence was " contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appiatn
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
93. Id at 372 n.4; see gmffa/ly Jeremy P. White, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 123 (2000)
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding that it had misapplied the Stri&/ari
standard. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court ruling that
under Stilanr v Wasbiv P4a the lack of mitigation evidence prejudiced the
defendant.9" Mitigation evidence should be used when comparing defendants in
proportionality review because t is often the only true evidence about the
defendant outside of the defendant's criminal record. Mitigation evidence can
have an enormous impact on a case and therefore should always be included in
any proportionality review.
Edding (1982) made consideration of mitigation evidence, if presented,
mandatory. lhaim (2000) effectivelymade presentation of mitigating evidence
mandatory. A pre-Eddi case in which the defendant was sentenced to death
might well have been a life case if the sentencer had considered whatever mitiga-
tion evidence was presented. A post-Ed&d , pre-Will/ia case in which the
defendant was sentenced to death might well have been a life case if mitigation
had been presented. Using those "old" death cases to determine what sentencers
"generally do" is improper. At best those "old" death cases can instruct what
sentencers did within the system in effect at the time the sentences were im-
posed.
2 I gdpliy jfPadefr Thcze Ccntioif ,Va1 Cni,
Another change in capital law that has had a substantial impact on capital
cases is the requirement of an instruction that informs the jury that a defendant
convicted of a capital crime is ineligible for parole. In Virginia, after January 1,
1995, all convicted defendants are parole ineligible. In Simn v Sc w*, Qmii
the United States Supreme Court held that in cases in which life or death are the
only sentencing options, the defendant is parole ineligible, and when the aggra-
vtinu factor is future dangerousness, the jurymust be instructed that "life means
e. In Yybn* v Ca rnuik,"8 the Supreme Court of Virginia expanded
the application of the Summ rule to cases in which the Commonwealth relies
solely on the vileness aggravating factor." Yakn held that the "life means
(analyzing Williams v. Taylr, 120 S. CL 1495 (2000)).
94. 466 US. 668 (1984); see also Wdiars, 529 US. at 372 n.4.
95. Wllian, 529 US. at 372;sSt.iddand v. Washington, 466 US. 668,694(1984) (holding
that a defendant is prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that the counsel's unprofessional
errors led to a different result in the proceeding).
96. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
97. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1984) (holding that a "life means life"
instrution must be given when future dangerousness is used as the aggravating factor and sentence
options are only a life or death sentence).
98. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
99. Yarbroughv. Commonwealth, 519 SE2d 602,616 (Va. 1999) (holing that life means
life" instructions should be given in cases where vileness is used as the aggravating factor); VA.
CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Mlchie 2000) (stating that life means life" instruction is given at the
request of the defendant).
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life" instruction is required in all capital cases in which a defendant is ineligible
for parole."° By instructing the jury that a life sentence means just that, a life
sentence, some jurors are more likely to impose a sentence of life than if they
believed a life sentence included a chance of parole. Cases in which defendants
were not allowed to give this instruction to the jury almost certainly produced a
higher percentage of death sentences.
Comparing current cases in which the instruction is required to older cases
in which the instruction was not required would be an inaccurate comparison.
There is no way to determine if the defendant in the previous case would have
been given a death sentence had the juryin that case been given the instruction.
After all, support for the death penalty drops to fifty-two percent when "life
imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of parole" is given as an alterna-
tive.'01 This is a fourteen percent drop from the number of people who generally
support the death penalty. The circumstances during sentencing have completely
changed and this should be reflected in the proportionality review.
Pre-Sinmmr (1994) and pre-abolition (1995) cases in which the death
sentence was based on future dangerousness only, should not be compared with
current death cases based onlyon that aggravator. Similarlypre- Yabnxi (1999)
cases in which the death sentence was based on vileness only, should not be
compared with current cases based only on that aggravator.
3. C6rW in VctrDiie
Requirements that must be met in order to sit on a capital juryhave changed
over the years. Specifically, jurors must now be willing to consider both
punishments of life in prison and death in order to sit on a capital jury.
lWrznp and later Wamuik v W'ut, c° which watered down WztJetspo, are
phrased in terms of the state's right to have jurors who are impartial on the death
penalty 0 Mogm on the other hand is phrased in terms of the same right on
behalf of the defendant.' To be more specific, Wmkmpoon was generally
understood to mean that the state was not entitled to exclusion for cause, even
if the juror expressed scruples, unless both "unmistakably clear" and "automati-
100. Yarbrough v. Commonweath, 519 S E2d 602,616 (Va. 1999).
101. Sw Newport, s"qma note 69.
102. 469 Us. 412 (1985).
103. SeWithetspoon v. Illinois,.391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding that the state is not entitled to
exclusion for cause, even if the juror expressed scruples, unless both "unmistalably clear" and
.automatfc were present in voir dire); WainwrigL t v. Wit, 469 US. 412 (1985) (holding that
the state is allowed to exlude any juror whose views prevent him from performing his duties as a
juror in accordance his instructions and his oath).
104. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 US. 719, 726 (1992).
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cally" were present.05 That is, only a juror who made it "unmistakablycleare that
he/she would "automatically ' vote against the death penalty was excludable. 6
Watt lowered the standard by allowing the state to exclude a juror whose
views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." 7 The United States
Supreme Court dispensed with Wdxnpocn's reference to "automatic"
decisionmaking, and the standard no longer requires that a juror's bias be proven
with "unmistakable clarity,"'0° The Court once again reversed a death sentence
based on juror bias in Morgu when it held that the defense is entitled to reverse-
Wudxkspor the jurors, that is, the question is now whether the juror would
automatically vote for death."°' In Moagi the Court held that in order to meet
due process demands, a defendant must be allowed to challenge for cause any
prospective juror who will automaticallyvote for the death penalty."0 If the state
may strike jurors who are absolutely opposed to the death penalty, then the
defendant must be able to strike those who are absolutely in favor of the death
penalty to meet due process requirements.'
Verdicts rendered before these cases, especiallyMoMF could have verywell
been decided bypredominantlypro death jurors. This affects theproportionality
review because it might provide for a greater number of de endants being
sentenced to death than would have been had the WdxnprxWzt/Mag
standards been in operation. Of course, it is only fair to note that there also
could have been a jury that was predominantly pro life. It is far less likely,
however, that these cases would be included in the review.
C (YavW m the Faieral Rerpwmrnt cfAqcmUlity Reiew
Instead of making the proportionality review more fair and accurate, the
current trend in most states is to repeal the statute requiring the review. States
started to repeal their statutes following the ruling in Pulley v Harris. 2 In Puley,
the Supreme Court of the United States retreated from its solid commitment to
the principle of proportionality" The issue in Puley was whether a state system
that did not include a comparative proportionality review was constitutional.'14
105. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510,522 n.21 (1968).
106. Id
107. Wainawright v. Wi, 469 U.S. 412,420 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 US. 38,45
(1980)).
108.' Id at 419.
109. Map; 504 US. at 726.
110. Id at 728.
111. Id at 729.
112. Pufleyv. Harris, 465 US. 37,53 (1984) (balding that a comparative proportionalityreview
is not a constitutional requirement).
113. Id
114. Id at 42.
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The Court, in finding that comparative proportionaltreview was not a constitu-
tional requirement, upheld the California system." Following this decision,
meaningful proportionality review has become rare." 6 It seems strange that the
Supreme Court would rule this way considering that the very language of the
Eighth Amendment seems to require proportionality in sentencing." 7 By
definition, the terms "excessive" and "unusual" include a proportionality com-
ponent. In fact, neither word seems to have any meaning absent comparison
with something else."' The Eighth Amendment supports the basic notion that
in a fair system of criminal justice, the punishment should reflect the circum-
stances of the offense, the character of the offender, and the nature of the
crime." In Fwmun v Qgia,12 0 Justice Brennan analyzed the Eighth Amend-
ment's use of the word "unusual," and concluded that the onlywaynot to violate
the Eighth Amendment, the only way to ensure that the punishment was not
excessive was to make the punishment proportionate."' He proposed that four
principles govern proportionality (1) the severity of the punishment; (2) the
probability of arbitrary application; (3) the level of acceptance by contemporary
society, and (4) the accomplishment of legitimate penal purposes." Justice
Brennan went on to determine that because the death penalty was inconsistent
with all four principles, its imposition violated the Eighth Amendment.23 While
each member of the five member majoftyin Fwmmhad a different basis for his
conclusion, each consistently focused on the theme of arbitrariness.' In Pulley,
the Court distinguished traditional proportionality review from comparative
proportionalityreview. '2 "Traditional" proportionalityreview asks whether the
sentence is disproportionate to the offense. 26 "Comparative" proportionality
review is a review in which the sentence imposed is compared to sentences of
others convicted of the same crime. 127 After Pulley traditional proportionality
115. Id at 53.
116. PennyJ. Whice, Can L4& Sike T& Oiaios 'fState CmsA rPdLey Hamis,
70 U. OLO. L REV. 813, 816-17 (1999) (surveying whether the Supreme Court's ruling inPdke)
which held that proportionality review is not constitutionally mandated, will lead to the return of
an arbitrary system of capital punishment).
117. Id at 819; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments).
118. White, supr note 116, at 819 n.27.
119. Id at 819.
120. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
121. Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238,279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. Id at 281-82.
123. Id at 305.
124. White, s"pa note 116, at 821; seegallynrFwmm, 408 US. 238 (1972).
125. White, sup"a note 116, at 833; swPulleyv. Harris, 465 US. 37,42-43 (1984).
126. White, supra note 116, at 833.
127. Id at 833-34; swPdL/.A 465 U.S. at 43.
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review is still mandated, although its application is narrow. Comparative propor-
tionality review is, however, no longer constitutionally required.'28
There is some difference between the way courts in California and Virginia
review for proportionality. California's proportionality review standard was
mandated by the state constitution, whereas Virginia's proportionality review is
statutorily mandated. 29 However, seven states which had statutorily mandated
proportionality review systems have repealed their provisions since Puley. 30
Many of the other states which have retained their provisions have nonetheless
recognized that proportionality review would no longer provide a basis for
federal review of capital sentences. "'
V. Camx1zin
Proportionality review was created to insure fairness in capital sentencing.
Without conducting the review in the manner in which it was intended to be
conducted, fairness will never be achieved. An adequate review necessarily
requires that cases in which a life sentence has been imposed must be included
in the comparison. Also, it is necessary in the comparison of defendants that
more than just prior criminal records need to be examined. Failure to consider
changes in capital law and the effect that those changes might have on the
legitimate similarities of some of these cases is unacceptable. Comparing cases
that were ruled on in a decidedlydifferent time is not a fair comparison. The way
in which proportionality review is conducted must be changed, otherwise, the
review is inaccurate, misleading and essentially serves no legitimate purpose.
Nonetheless, the proportionality review statute should be retained because it
reflects the fundamental fairness that the Eighth Amendment was intended to
protect.
128. White, s"ra note 116, at 837-38.
129. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Mlchie 1999).
130. Connecticut repealed proportionaltyreviewin 1995. S~eCONN. GEN. STAT. S 53a-46(b)
(Supp. 1998). Idaho repealed proportionalityreviewin 1994. SeIDAHOGODE S 19-2827(c) (1997).
Maryland repealed proportionality review in 1992. Se MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, S 414(e) (1996).
Nevada eliminated proportionality review in 1985. See NEV. REV. STAT. S 177.055(2)(d) (1997).
Oklahoma repealed proportionality review in 1985. Sw OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, S 701.13(c) (Supp.
1999). Pennsylvania repealed proportionality review in 1997. Sw PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, S
9711(h)0)(iii) (West 1998). Wyoming repealed proportionality review in 1989. SeeWYo. STAT.
ANN. S 6-2-103(d)(i) (Mlchie 1997). SeegmmuyWhite, spm note 116, at 848.
131. White, s"qra note 116, at 848.
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